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RESTITUTION-AVAILABILITY AS AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY 
WHERE PLAINTIFF HAs FULLY PERFORMED A CONTRACT To PRO-
VIDE Goons OR SERVICES-It is hornbook law that restitution is 
sometimes available as an alternative remedy to a party who has 
suffered a breach of contract after having conferred a benefit on 
the defaulting party. It is equally clear, however, that in many 
cases where a benefit has been conferred, the plaintiff may not 
1958] COMMENTS 269 
elect to sue for the value of his performance but is left to his 
action for damages on the contract. The cases which are con-
cerned with one or the other of the above rules constitute a large 
portion of the area of the law called Restitution, and no attempt 
will be made here to review all of the situations in which res-
titution may be available as an alternative remedy for breach 
of contract. On the contrary, the purpose of this comment will be 
to consider the availability of the remedy in a single class of cases 
and to discuss some of the factors which may have caused the 
courts to grant or deny the remedy in those cases. The rather 
small group of cases with which this comment will be concerned 
are those in which the plaintiff has fully performed, prior to a 
breach by the defendant, a contract to deliver goods or render 
services. For convenience, and also because of differing results 
in the courts, the cases in which the defendant's obligation was 
to pay money will be discussed separately from those in which 
his obligation was to do something else. 
I. Availability of the Remedy 
A. Where Defendant's Obligation Is To Pay Money. When 
the plaintiff has fully performed a valid contract to deliver goods 
or render services for an agreed sum of money, and the defendant 
has breached the contract by failing to pay, the courts have uni-
formly denied to the plaintiff the alternative remedy of rescission 
and restitution for the value of his performance.1 While as a 
matter of pleading the injured party may frame his complaint 
in indebitatus assumpsit and rely on the common counts, this 
is considered nothing more than a convenient method of collect-
ing the debt raised by plaintiff's performance of the contract.2 
It is everywhere agreed that if the evidence discloses the existence 
of a special contract, the terms of the contract will control the 
amount of recovery.3 It has often been observed that this rule 
represents a limitation on the use of the restitutionary remedy 
1 Oliver v. Campbell, 43 Cal. (2d) 298, 273 P. (2d) 15 (1954), and cases collected in 
5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1110 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §§1458, 1459 (1937); 
WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS §262 (1913). See also 2 CONTRACTS R.EsrATEMENT §350 (1932). 
2 United States Potash Co. v. McNutt, (10th Cir. 1934) 70 F. (2d) 126, and cases col-
lected in 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1459, p. 4076, n. 4 (1937). 
3 Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall. (69 U.S.) 1 (1864); Oliver L. Taetz, Inc. v. Groff, 363 Mo. 
825, 253 S.W. (2d) 824 (1953). See cases collected in 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1110 (1951) and 
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1459 (1937). 
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that is logically difficult to explain in light of the treatment given 
to similar situations.4 The case most difficult to distinguish in this 
regard is that of a party who has partially performed a contract 
to supply goods or services for money and has been prevented by 
the defendant's breach from completing performance.5 In such 
a case a large majority of the courts quite readily allow the plain-
tiff to rescind the contract and recover the fair value of his per-
formance. 6 The arguments which are advanced in support of 
the granting of restitution in the case of the plaintiff who has 
only partially performed appear equally applicable to the case 
of full performance. In both situations the plaintiff is free from 
fault and the defendant has breached the contract after accepting 
benefits through the plaintiff's performance. But such arguments, 
while often successful when the plaintiff has rendered only part 
performance, fall on deaf ears once it appears that the plaintiff 
has fully performed. When full performance is shown, the plain-
tiff may sue only for the loss of his bargain, and the defendant 
is given the benefit of the contract terms to limit the amount 
of the judgment against him. 
In view of the relative newness of the restitutionary remedy, 
it is perhaps misleading to speak in terms of a limitation on the 
substantive rights of a plaintiff who has fully performed such a 
contract. It would probably be more accurate to say that a party 
who has rendered only part performance prior to a breach has 
been given a valuable alternative remedy that has not been given 
to one who has fully performed a similar contract. But it is never-
theless true that a party who has rendered full performance is 
in a much less favorable position than one who is prevented 
4 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1110, p. 484 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1459, p. 
4078, n. 6 (1937); WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS §262, p. 415 (1913). 
5 The case of a plaintiff who seeks to recover money paid to the defendant for 
promised goods or services which are not forthcoming appears logically to call for the 
same result as where the plaintiff has rendered goods or services in expectation of payment. 
But ,the case of money paid seems to be sui generis in the law of Restitution, and it is 
believed that little would be gained by considering such a case in this discussion. 
6 Spitalny v. Tanner Constr. Co., 75 Ariz. 192, 254 P. (2d) 440 (1953); Boomer v. 
Muir, (Cal. App. 1933) 24 P. (2d) 570; Johnston v. Star .Bucket Pump Co., 274 Mo. 414, 
202 S.W. 1143 (1918); 2 CoNTRACTs RESTATEMENT §347 (1932). See cases collected in 5 
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1459, p. 4077, n. 6 (1937); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1109 
(1951). This proposition is subject to the qualification that if the part of the contract 
performed by the plaintiff was an apportioned part of the whole contract for which a 
definite sum had been agreed upon, the plaintiff's recovery is limited to the agreed sum. 
See 2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT §351 (1932), and cases collected in 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 
§1111 (1951). 
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from completing performance of the contract by defendant's 
breach, if the market price of the goods or services accepted by 
the defendant was above the contract figure. The existence of this 
anomaly in the law has been recognized and criticized by text-
writers for over half a century,7 but their suggestions that the 
restitutionary remedy be extended to cases in which the plaintiff 
has fully performed a contract calling for the payment of money 
have gone entirely unheeded by the courts. 
B. Where Defendant's Obligation Is Other Than To Pay 
Money. The Restatement of Contracts notwithstanding,8 it seems 
clear that restitution is ordinarily not available to a plaintiff who 
has delivered goods or rendered services in full performance of 
a contract which calls for some performance other than the 
payment of money by the defendant.9 It is true, however, that 
the courts have not been as uniform in their refusal to grant 
the alternative remedy in this type situation as they have been in 
cases where the defendant's obligation was to pay money. More-
over, it appears that at least some progress in this area is being 
made in extending the use of the restitutionary remedy. 
A number of cases have allowed a quantum meruit recovery 
of the value of services rendered where the promised consideration 
was either stock or a share in a business.10 The value of the serv-
ices rendered was also recovered where the defendant railroad 
7 WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS §262 (1913), citing KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS, pp. 
301, 302 (1893); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §lllO (1951). Williston observes that this anomaly 
" ..• puts it within the power of the defendant, in many instances, to determine the 
extent of the plaintiff's recovery for a breach by the former." 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 
2d ed., §1459, p. 4078, n. 6 (1937). But see 7 CoRN. L. Q. 166-170 (1922), where the use of 
restitution as an alternative remedy for breach of contract, except in the case of money 
paid, is disapproved. 
s "The remedy of restitution in money is not available to one who has fully performed 
his part of a contract, if the only part of the agreed exchange for such performance that 
has not been rendered by the defendant is a sum of money constituting a liquidated 
debt; but full performance does not make restitution unavailable if any part of the con-
sideration due from the defendant in return is something other than a liquidated debt." 
2 CONTRACTS R.EsTATEMENT §350 (1932). 
9 Kopp v. Traders Gate City Nat. Bank, 357 Mo. 659, 210 S.W. (2d) 49 (19!8); Ogden 
v. Ruhm, (2d Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 1007; Clemmer v. Merriken, 144 Md. 675, 125 A. 394 
(1924); Cook v. Dade, 191 Mich. 561, 158 N.W. 175 (1916); Osterling v. Cape May Hotel 
Co., 82 N.J.L. 650, 83 A. 887 (19ll); Hull v. Thoms, 82 Conn. 647, 74 A. 925 (1910); 
Pierson v. Spaulding, 61 Mich. 90, 27 N.W. 865 (1886); Slayton v. McDonald, 73 Me. 50 
(1881); Mitchell v. Gile, 12 N.H. 390 (1841). The case most often cited for the proposition 
that restitution is available in this situation, Clark v. Fairchild, 22 Wend. (N.Y.) 576 (1840), 
is doubtful law in New York. Compare Ladue v. Seymour, 24 Wend. (N.Y.) 60 (1840); 
Underhill v. Pomeroy, 2 Hill (N.Y.) 603 (1842); Thomas v. Dickinson, 12 N.Y. 364 (1855). 
10 Bailey v. Interstate Airmotive, Inc., 358 Mo. ll21, 219 S.W. (2d) 333 (1949); Coens 
v. Marousis, 275 Pa. 478, II9 A. 549 (1923); Humbert v. Chopy, (D.C. Colo. 1914) 216 F. 549. 
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refused to deliver a promised pass over its lines.11 Another situa-
. tion in which restitution of the value of plaintiff's performance 
has sometimes been allowed is where the defendant has breached 
a promise to compensate plaintiff by his will.12 But in almost 
all these situations there are also cases denying restitution to the 
plaintiff, and in many of the fact situations which might properly 
fall under this general heading there is no authority at all in 
favor of granting restitution. In sum, it appears that when the 
defendant's promised performance is other than the payment 
of money, the plaintiff who has fully performed is in a somewhat 
better position with regard to getting restitution than he would 
be if all that was owing to him was money. But this is only a 
relative advantage since, even when the return performance is 
not money, the plaintiff who has fully performed faces an uphill 
struggle in his ·attempt to get the value of his performance rather 
than the value of what was promised him. 
II. Reasons Underlying the Refusal To Grant Restitution 
When Plaintiff Has Fully Performed 
The starting point for any discussion of the reasons why 
restitution is or is not available in a given case must always 
be with the historical origins of the · remedy. Developed in part 
by the law judges and in part by the chancellors, the remedy of 
restitution was thought of as a strictly auxiliary remedy to be 
used in situations where the standard common law remedies 
sounding in tort or contract were not completely satisfactory.13 
11 Brown v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 36 Minn. 236, 31 N.W. 941 (1886). 
12 Boldwin v. Lay, (Mo. App. 1920) 226 S.W. 602; Stone v. Todd, 49 N.J.L. 274, 8 A. 
300 (1887). See also 69 A.L.R. 14 (1930). In many of the cases where the defendant's 
promise was to leave property by will, it is difficult to determine if the contract \\·as within 
the Statute of Frauds, and therefore, whether restitution was employed as an alternative 
remedy. Some courts have said that the rendition of services constitutes "part payment" 
which takes the contract out of both the Statute of Frauds and §4 of the Uniform Sales 
Act. But other courts do not agree. See 2 Prrr. L. REv. 29 (1935). 
13 5 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1103 (1951). For a review of the status of the English law 
of quasi-contract prior to the development of the action of indebitatus assumpsit around 
the beginning of the seventeenth century, see JACKSON, HISTORY OF QUASI•CoNTRAcr 1-36 
(1936). It was more than a century after Slade's Case was decided in 1602 before general 
assumpsit was first employed as an alternative remedy for breach of contract in Dutch 
v. Warren, 1 Str. 406, 93 Eng. Rep. 598 (1721), where the plaintiff was allowed to recover 
money advanced to the defendant to buy stock. Use of the remedy in contract cases did 
not become widespread until the time of Lord Mansfield in the latter half of the eight-
eenth century, but for sometime thereafter it expanded in many directions. See FIFOOT, 
LORD MANSFIELD 141-157, 245-249 (1936). A strong reaction to the use of restitution in 
many situations, including contract cases, occurred in England about the time of the Com-
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The use of restitution as an alternative remedy in breach of 
contract cases was mainly the work of the law judges, but they 
administered it with many of the same verbal palliatives used 
by the chancellors during the development of the equitable 
remedies.14 They refused to apply it in many cases where the 
damage remedy was felt to :tJe more appropriate, and this fact 
produced many of the distinctions which seem so illogical today. 
Although there was no expressly stated requirement of "inade-
quacy of the damage remedy," as in equity, the relative effective-
ness of the action for damages undoubtedly was a major factor 
in the granting or withholding of restitution in any particular 
case.15 This factor goes a long way toward explaining some of 
the logical inconsistencies mentioned above. For instance, a 
plaintiff who, prior to a breach, has only partially performed 
a contract to render goods or services is in a comparatively diffi-
cult position to establish his damages in an action on the con-
tract. This is not so for the plaintiff who has fully performed; 
and having no need of an auxiliary remedy, the party who had 
fully performed was not given one. But however well the quasi-
equitable nature of the remedy serves to explain the origin 
of the anomalies that exist in its present-day application, the 
steadfast refusal of the courts in this century to extend the use 
of restitution to cases in which the plaintiff has fully performed 
calls for an explanation having more contemporary significance. 
In view of the almost unanimous recommendation of the text-
writers in recent years that restitution be made available to 
a plaintiff who has fully performed a contract to provide goods 
or services, 16 at least where the counter-performance was other 
than the payment of money, something more is required in the 
mon Law Procedure Act of 1852. This reaction had the effect of halting the development 
of restitution as an alternative remedy for breach of contract in England. FIFOOT, HisrORY 
AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 368-370 (1949); DAWSON, UNJUsr ENRICHMENT 15-26 
(1951). 
14 The most famous of these nostrums is Lord Mansfield's comment in Moses v. 
Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005 at 1012, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760): "In one word, the gist of this 
kind of action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by 
the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money." 
15 Occasionally, the courts expressly base the grant or denial of restitution on the 
adequacy of the damage remedy. See, e.g., Judge Kellogg in Rosenwasser v. Blyn Shoes, 
246 N.Y. 340, 159 N.E. 84 (1929): "A situation is presented where an action of damages 
for breach of contract ••• would afford complete indemnity for the injury done •••• " 
16 KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS 301, 302 (1893); WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS §262 (1913), 
adopting the arguments of Professor Keener; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1110 (1951); 5 WILLis-
TON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1471 (1937). 
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way of explanation than Justice Holmes' famous maxim: "A 
page of history is worth a volume of logic." 
Professor Corbin has suggested that the preferred position 
of one who has only partially performed such a contract is best 
explained on procedural grounds.17 He points out that a party 
who has fully performed in this situation has available to him 
both the action of debt for the sum due and an action for damages 
on the contract, while the plaintiff who has partially performed 
has, absent the restitutionary remedy, only his action on the 
contract. By giving to the latter a restitutionary action for the 
value of his performance, he is put in an equal position with 
regard to the forms of action available to him in the event of 
a breach. But Professor Williston has observed that in neither case 
is the remedy of restitution absolutely necessary, since in either 
situation the injured party has an effective remedy in an action 
for damages on the contract.18 While it may be conceaed that 
a desire to equalize the positions of the parties with respect to 
the forms of action they may use might have played some part 
in the granting of restitution to one who had partially per-
formed, in light of our modern pleading practices it surely does 
not go far to explain the extreme reluctance of our courts to 
extend the remedy to a plaintiff who has fully performed prior to 
a breach. 
It is here suggested that there are several very practical 
reasons why the courts have ignored both logic and the text-
writers by continuing the practice of granting restitution to one 
who has partially performed while denying it where there has 
been full performance. In those cases where the defendant's 
obligation is to pay money, the most important of these is the 
matter of convenience. It is readjly apparent that in the case 
of full performance of a contract calling for payment of a fixed 
sum of money by the defendant, any court would be reluctant 
to reject this ready-made measure of damages and get into the 
sticky question of the fair value of the plaintiff's performance. 
Such valuations are usually arrived at only after varying amounts 
of conflicting evidence have been heard, and, even in the rare 
case where there is no sharp conflict in the evidence, the value 
arrived at lacks the aura of certainty and justness possessed by a 
17 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1110 (1951). 
18 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., §1459, pp. 4077, 4078 (1937). 
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sum which was agreed upon by the parties when they entered 
into their bargain. In those cases where full performance has 
been rendered for an agreed price, therefore, this factor of con-
venience appears to be an insurmountable barrier to the applica-
tion of restitution as an alternative remedy. In those cases where 
the defendant's promised performance is not money but other 
goods or services, the convenience factor is not such an obstacle. 
On the contrary, it has been in the situations where valuation of 
the promised performance was more difficult than arriving at the 
worth of the goods or services rendered by the plaintiff that 
restitution has been most often employed.19 But the usual situa-
tion in these cases is that the valuation difficulties are approxi-
mately equal between the rendered and the promised perform-
ances, so the convenience factor cannot be said to be a major 
influence in the grant or refusal of restitution when the de-
fendant's promised performance is goods or services. 
There are other factors, however, which tend to inhibit the 
use of the restitutionary remedy in these cases. One of these 
considerations is the rather widespread notion that in granting 
restitution a court is "making a new contract" for the parties. 
This objection is occasionally raised in all types of cases where 
restitution is employed as an alternative remedy for breach of 
contract,20 but it apparently has added force when a plaintiff 
who has fully performed comes into court asking for a sum dif-
ferent from the value of what he was promised. As has been 
pointed out, there is little merit in this objection.21 When a court 
assesses damages for breach of contract it does not purport to 
enforce the contract specifically. The usual view is that the court 
is attempting to put the injured party in the same position he 
would have been in had there been no breach; but there is 
19 E.g., a pass over the lines of a railroad, Brown v. St. Paul, M. &: M. Ry. Co., 36 
Minn. 236, 31 N.W. 941 (1886); stock or a share in- a business, Bailey v. Interstate Air-
motive, 358 Mo. 1121, 219 S.W. (2d) 333 (1949); Coens v. Marousis, 275 Pa. 478, 119 A. 
549 (1923); Humbert v. Chopy, (D.C. Colo. 1914) 216 F. 549. 
20 "Beyond doubt the only injury sustained by the mere breach of a contract is the 
loss of the bargain .•.. I think the plaintiff in a building contract ought not to be 
permitted, under the guise of a quantum meruit, for the alleged breach of the building 
contract by the owner, to recover beyond the price fixed in the contract; for the reason 
that any greater recovery would be, in effect, damages awarded for punishment rather 
than compensation for loss of a bargain, and therefore opposed to the reason and spirit 
of the law governing damages for breach of civil engagements." Judge Bond dissenting 
in Johnston v. Star Bucket Pump Co., 274 Mo. 414 at 479, 202 S.W. 1143 (1918). 
215 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1106 (1951). 
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nothing inherently more just in this approach than in the theory 
which underlies the remedy of restitution, which is to put the 
injured party in the position he was in before the contract was 
entered into. In no case has the defendant agreed to pay damages 
of any kind, and as he has seen fit to breach the contract there is 
little reason to give him the benefit of the contract terms and 
thereby relieve him from paying full value for what he has 
received. The idea that a plaintiff who has fully performed should 
get no more than he bargained for is still, however, an obstacle 
which must be overcome in any attempt to get restitution. 
The final factor which, it is believed, has limited the ex-
pansion of the restitutionary remedy to cases involving full per-
formance by the plaintiff has been the fact that lawyers rarely 
attempt to get restitution when their clients have suffered a 
breach of contract. Where the breached contract has turned out 
to be a bad bargain for tl1e defendant, the damage remedy is 
obviously the better recourse for the plaintiff. But the lack of 
case authority involving attempts to get restitution where the 
plaintiff's performance was of more value than what he was 
promised by the breaching defendant should not discourage an 
attempt to invoke the restitutionary remedy in the appropriate 
circumstances. The use of this remedy has expanded widely in 
recent years and is still in the process of growth.22 With the 
aid of the leading text-writers23 and the Restatement of Con-
tracts,24 there is no valid reason why it Cc!;nnot be extended 
further, especially to cases in which the plaintiff has rendered full 
performance in goods or services for a promise by the defendant 
to do something other than pay money. 
Jerome K. Walsh, Jr., S.Ed. 
22 See, generally, DAWSON, UNJUsr ENRICHMENT (1951). 
23 Note 16 supra. 
24 Note 8 supra. 
